Executive summary. In a sample of seven large defined contribution (DC) plans, automatic enrollment reduces differences in savings and investment behavior associated with race and ethnicity. Participation rates rise across the board with automatic enrollment, but particularly for blacks and Hispanics. Automatically enrolled whites and Asians are more likely to override the default deferral rate than blacks and Hispanics, leading to a difference in deferral rates. Automatic enrollment to a default target-date fund equalizes risk-taking and reduces extreme portfolio allocations for all groups.
Background
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the study of workforce diversity in DC retirement plans-and in particular, the role of race and ethnicity in savings and investment choices.
1 Some studies have highlighted large differences in saving behavior among racial and ethnic groups, particularly that of blacks and Hispanics compared with Asians and whites, suggesting there are distinct racial and ethnic approaches to saving for retirement. At the same time, such differences have typically been shown to decrease when adjusting for other demographic factors, suggesting that these differences are less a function of race and ethnicity and are more the result of differences in income or education. Meanwhile, other studies have pointed to broader issues affecting minority groups, including reduced access to retirement savings plans at work or lower levels of financial literacy. 2 Many studies in this area have recommended that automatic plan design features-automatic enrollment, automatic escalation, and diversified default investing-might remedy such differences. While this has always seemed to be a reasonable assumption, to date there has been only limited evidence that automatic features might improve savings outcomes for blacks and Hispanics compared with outcomes for whites and Asians. 3 Our current study confirms that the use of automatic plan design features does, indeed, reduce racial and ethnic disparities.
1 The term race/ethnicity is used throughout this document to refer to racial groups (whites, blacks, and Asians) and ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanics) in which members may be part of various racial groups. 2 See Ariel/Hewitt, 2009. Munnell and Sulivan, 2009; and Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011 , as recent references. 3 Madrian and Shea, in their 2001 study of automatic enrollment using a single plan, did find that the feature eliminated racial differences in participation rates.
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Portfolio characteristics. Automatic enrollment into target-date funds equalizes equity risk-taking among all groups and reduces extreme equity allocations, particularly highly aggressive asset allocations. More than three-quarters of blacks and Hispanics remain in the default fund when automatically enrolled compared with 68% of whites and 60% of Asians. There is a small but noticeable tendency for some Asians and whites to hold very aggressive equity allocations, and for some blacks to hold zero-equity portfolios-although the effects are generally minor and are reduced significantly under automatic enrollment.
Implications. Plan sponsors concerned about disparities in savings and investment behavior among black and Hispanic participants should consider the use of automatic plan design features to reduce these differences. Since these groups are more likely to remain at plan defaults, the burden falls on the sponsor to ensure that default choices are appropriate for building adequate retirement savings over time. In particular, we suggest setting higher initial default contribution rates under automatic enrollment and augmenting automatic enrollment with an automatic escalation feature to reduce differences in retirement plan deferrals over time. We also suggest the use of an appropriate, diversified default fund, such as a target-date fund series, to reduce differences in average investing behavior and the incidence of extreme portfolios.
Investments in target-date funds are subject to the risks of their underlying funds. The year in the fund name refers to the approximate year (the target date) when an investor in the fund would retire and leave the workforce. The fund will gradually shift its emphasis from more aggressive investments to more conservative ones based on its target date. An investment in a target-date fund is not guaranteed at any time, including on or after the target date.
Our study is based on a sample of seven large DC plans whose sponsors agreed to provide race and ethnicity data for their participant populations. 4 These plans adopted various automatic design features in recent years, thus providing a natural opportunity for comparing those hired previously under voluntary enrollment with more recent employees hired under automatic enrollment. The seven plans include more than 250,000 active participants.
We recognize that these seven plans do not represent a random statistical sample of the broader U.S. DC system. At the same time, we believe that the results of our study do contribute to the emerging body of research on retirement plan behavior and diversity, and will help lay the foundation for future diversity research using larger data sets. We also hope that this type of research will encourage other plan sponsors to consider providing such information for future research efforts. Although our results are based on a limited sample, it is encouraging that they are broadly consistent with other household finance research work on racial and ethnic differences.
One important caveat about our study is that it was conducted in the context of well-designed and generous retirement programs offered by seven large companies. It is intended to examine racial and ethnic differences in that context. It is not intended to address racial and ethnic differences that may exist more broadly beyond the world of workplace retirement plans-whether in personal savings or in household wealth accumulation. Our study addresses only part of the household wealth picture-a worker's current workplace savings planalbeit a growing and important part of the balance sheet for many Americans. This paper, the first in a series examining diversity and DC plan savings, begins with a brief introduction to the sample. We then consider the impact of automatic plan features on plan participation rates, deferral rates, and investment behavior among various racial and ethnic groups.
3 4 One plan accounted for about half of the participant sample. We used a variety of robustness checks to ensure that our results were not biased by this one plan, including, in one test, eliminating the plan entirely from the sample. Participant characteristics Figure 1 .
Eligible employees in seven defined contribution plans as of 2010
By racial/ethnic group
The study sample Our sample consists of seven large DC plans whose sponsors provided race and ethnicity data for their active participant population. These plans included more than 250,000 active plan participants. The companies operate in a diverse set of industries including natural resources, financial services, health care, transportation, and technology. Data for the sample was extracted in 2010.
The largest racial and ethnic group in the sample is whites (65%), followed by blacks (21%), Hispanics (10%), and Asians (3%) (Figure 1 ). Other racial and ethnic groups, including Native Americans and Pacific Islanders, make up the remaining 1%. 5 Fifty-nine percent of the sample is male. The median age is 43.8 years; the median job tenure, 9.6 years. Median participant income is $47,381.
Each of the seven plans adopted automatic enrollment in recent years. 6 The average initial default deferral rate under automatic enrollment is 3.2%. Five plans set the default rate at 3% while one plan defaults at 4% and another at 6%. In all seven plans, all new hires were automatically enrolled as of a given date that varies by plan. Two plans also chose to "sweep" (i.e., automatically enroll) eligible nonparticipants into the plan as of certain plan-specific dates. However, we adjust for this sweep and, as a result, our study focuses exclusively on the impact of automatic enrollment among new hires.
7 For all but one plan, a participant receives the plan's full match by deferring 6% of earnings. In all seven plans, the default investment is a target-date fund series.
In addition, four plans use an automatic escalation feature for automatically enrolled participants that automatically increases the employee deferral rate by a set amount each year. The typical default escalation rate is 1% of earnings per year. In our sample, the average participant who was automatically enrolled in a plan with an automatic escalation feature has been subject to only one automatic increase. For many in this group, this increase likely occurred during or just after the 2008-2009 financial crisis-an important consideration in interpreting the results.
In total, 22% of the participants in our sample were exposed to automatic enrollment ( Figure 2 ). Ten percent of the sample was eligible for automatic enrollment only, and 12% of the sample was eligible for automatic enrollment with an automatic escalation feature.
5 Given its small size, results for the "other" group are statistically insignificant and not reported in this study. 6 All but one plan adopted automatic enrollment within the past six years. One plan introduced it in 1999. 7 Participants are categorized as voluntarily or automatically enrolled based upon the plan's enrollment scheme effective on their hire date. As a result, participants who were "swept" under automatic enrollment were classified as eligible nonparticipants under voluntary enrollment because they first entered the plan under that scheme and chose not to enroll. Voluntary and automatic enrollment designs Figure 2 .
By racial/ethnic group These automatic plan features result in large differences in savings and investment behavior, even before controlling for other factors. The overall participation rate under voluntary enrollment is 73% ( Figure 3, panel A) . Under automatic enrollment, it is 93%, or 20 percentage points higher ( Figure 3, panel B) .
Under voluntary enrollment, participation rates among blacks (59%) and Hispanics (68%) lag rates for whites (77%) and Asians (91%). Average participant deferral rates for blacks (6.6%) and Hispanics (6.8%) also are lower than for whites (8.3%) and Asians (10.1%). In terms of portfolio construction, whites and Asians hold, on average, more funds in their portfolios (4.2 and 4.8, respectively) than blacks and Hispanics (3.4 and 3.8, respectively). Under voluntary enrollment, blacks have slightly lower equity allocations, at 64%, than other racial or ethnic groups and they are slightly more likely to hold a single fund.
Automatic enrollment reduces many of these differences (Figure 3, panel B) . Under automatic enrollment, whites, blacks, and Hispanics participate at essentially the same rate, while Asians continue to participate at higher rates. Deferral rates, on average, are lower across the board under automatic enrollment-reflecting the tendency of plans to choose low default deferral rates and also the fact that the automatic escalation feature is relatively new among those plans offering it-but noticeable differences in deferral rates by race/ethnicity remain. Differences in equity allocations become much smaller under automatic enrollment. But a noticeable finding is the much higher tendency of blacks and Hispanics to remain in a single default fund.
These values are summary statistics and so do not reflect the differences related solely to race and ethnicity. For example, the observed difference in participation rates between blacks and whites under voluntary enrollment may be the result of differences in income, age, or job tenure, not simply race. Our analysis uses various regression techniques to isolate the impact of race and ethnicity on participation rates, contribution rates, and portfolio choice. Our control variables include age, gender, and race/ethnicity, along with income, job tenure, education, and a measure of nonretirement-plan household wealth. Our models do not account for unobserved variables like financial literacy or trust, and so we can only hypothesize about the effect of these and other factors that may influence savings and portfolio differences by race and ethnicity.
The complete specification for our models is included in the Appendix. In the remaining sections of this paper, we report on predicted effects from our models to isolate the unique influence of automatic plan features associated with race and ethnicity.
Participation rates
The impact of automatic enrollment on plan participation rates is straightforward and quite powerful. Predicted participation rates from our model are higher across the board among all race and ethnic groups, when controlling for all other factors (Figure 4) . The largest improvement is for blacks-predicted participation rates jump from 57% under voluntary enrollment to 94% under automatic enrollment, a relative increase of more than 60%. Hispanic participation rates also jump from 67% under voluntary enrollment to 95% under automatic enrollment, a relative increase of more than 40%. Predicted participation rates are also much higher among whites, and even among Asians, who are already participating at a very high rate under voluntary enrollment.
These results demonstrate that automatic enrollment addresses racial and ethnic gaps in participation behavior and provides a benefit to all groups. However, automatic enrollment is particularly beneficial for blacks and Hispanics-especially for low-income blacks and Hispanics ( Figure 5) . These low-income groups are far less likely to participate in a DC plan under voluntary enrollment. The predicted participation rate under voluntary enrollment among black workers earning less than $30,000 a year is only 35%; for Hispanic workers in the same income group, it is only 36%. These rates jump to 93% and 94%, respectively, under automatic enrollment.
Employee deferral rates
Under voluntary enrollment, whites in our model are predicted to defer an average of 6% of wages to their DC plan account, while blacks are predicted to defer 5.1% and Hispanics 5.4%, after controlling for other variables (Figure 6, left) . Asians are predicted to save disproportionately more than all other groups, with a predicted deferral rate of 7.6% under voluntary enrollment. These predicted differences, reflecting all of the controls in our regression model, are smaller than the differences noted earlier in the summary statistics (Figure 3) . For example, in the summary statistics, blacks had an average deferral rate of 6.6% compared with 8.3% for whites-a difference of 1.7 percentage points. This difference falls to 0.9 percentage points when we control for differences in income, education, and other factors between whites and blacks.
However, while these absolute differences appear small, it's important to note that, if the average deferral rate is 6%, a one-point difference is, in fact, 17% lower. Over time, these differences can translate into meaningfully lower retirement account balances.
What happens to predicted employee deferral rates under automatic enrollment? We examined predicted deferral behavior under two automatic designs: automatic enrollment alone (i.e., without an automatic escalation feature) and automatic enrollment combined with an automatic escalation feature. Participation rates among blacks and Hispanics by income levels and type of enrollment Figure 5 .
Eligible employees in seven defined contribution plans as of 2010.
9 Choi, Laibson, Metrick, 2002. Nessmith, Utkus, and Young, 2007. 10 It is important not to misinterpret these averages as blanket statements, such as "all blacks stay at the default" or "all Asians override the default and save more." Our predicted effects demonstrate the net effect of all changes. For any given group, there will be automatically enrolled participants who remain at the default, who select a higher savings rate, and who choose a lower savings rate. Our model shows the net results of all three of these groups-on a net basis, Asians increase their savings, while, on a net basis, blacks remain at the default. As expected, automatic enrollment alone reduces average deferral rates across the board (Figure 6 , middle). The average contribution rate drops to 4.4% for participants who were automatically enrolled into their plans, compared with 6% for those voluntarily enrolling. Prior research has shown that participants tend to remain at the default deferral rate recommended by the plan sponsor, and most sponsors set low deferral rates.
9 Under automatic enrollment, there are more participants in the plan and higher aggregate savings. But there are also participants at the default deferral rate who probably would have enrolled at a higher level. This fact underscores the importance of setting higher deferral rates under automatic enrollment.
With automatic enrollment alone, there remain meaningful differences in deferral rates by race and ethnicity. Over time, some members of all groups tend to override the default deferral rate of 3%. However, more whites and Asians are likely to override and choose a higher deferral rate than are blacks and Hispanics. As a result, under automatic enrollment alone, whites, on average, defer 4.4% of income and Asians defer 5.6%, compared with 3.8% for blacks and 3.7% for Hispanics.
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In our sample, most automatically enrolled participants were also subject to an automatic escalation feature. Over our analysis period, we would expect deferral rates to increase by an average of about 1 percentage point because of the autoescalation feature, given the time it has been in place in our sample plans. Among whites, blacks, and Hispanics, however, the average deferral rate increased by 0.7 percentage points (Figure 6, right) . This reflects the net effect of all changes to participant deferral rates-any automatic increase plus any voluntary increases or decreases in deferral rates by the participants. The 0.7-point result suggests that some whites, Hispanics, and blacks in this group reduced their deferral rates and, in effect, partially offset the 1% increase. Meanwhile, among Asians, average deferral rates rose by 1.4 percentage points, suggesting that, on average, not only did many benefit from the 1% automatic increase, but many also increased their deferral rates voluntarily by more than 1%.
One dilemma here is that, for the average participant in an autoescalation plan, the automatic increase would have occurred at some point during (or shortly after) the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Because we observe only one automatic increase for the typical participant, it is difficult to isolate the effect of the automatic increase from the effect that a major event such as the financial crisis has on these seven specific plans. The net change we observe for all groups may include a reaction to the economic and market environment at the time.
With this caveat in mind, our results show that deferral rates rise for all race and ethnic groups when the plan offers both automatic enrollment and automatic increases. However, differences in deferral rates among these groups remain. Future research is needed to determine whether an autoescalation feature operating over a longer period can eliminate or reduce these differences. For example, as automatic increases occur over time, the differences among different racial and ethnic groups may narrow.
Portfolio characteristics
In our sample, voluntarily enrolled participants can choose among all plan investment options, which include traditional investment options as well as "all-in-one" fund strategies such as balanced or target-date funds. Automatically enrolled participants are defaulted into an age-appropriate target-date fund.
As noted earlier, there are modest differences in average equity allocations by race and ethnic groups (Figure 3) . Under voluntary enrollment, when controlling for other factors in our model, these small differences persist (Figure 7) . Black participants take somewhat less risk on average than white participants, with Asians and Hispanics falling in between. Yet under automatic enrollment, when participants are defaulted into a target-date strategy, these differences are essentially eliminated. Average equity allocations rise slightly for all groups, reflecting the default investment allocation of the target-date funds.
This convergence in average behavior is not simply because all of the automatically enrolled participants remain in the default. The propensity to remain in the default investment differs by race and ethnicity (Figure 8 ). More than three-quarters of blacks and Hispanics are predicted to remain in the default fund compared with 68% of whites and 60% of Asians. It appears that the target-date fund has a stronger default effect for blacks and Hispanics. For Asians and whites, the target-date fund appears to have an anchoring or reference-setting effect for equity allocation. Despite a higher tendency to override the default, whites and Asians show the same equity allocation as blacks and Hispanics. One particular benefit of diversified default investing under automatic enrollment is the tendency to reduce extreme portfolio allocations.
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This benefit appears to carry over to all racial and ethnic groups. Under voluntary enrollment (Figure 9 , top), there are relatively large groups of participants investing in aggressive portfolios (with greater than 90% in equities) or conservative portfolios (less than 40% in equities). Of particular concern are ultraconservative investors holding nothing in equities. Black participants are more likely to be in this category than other racial and ethnic groups, although the absolute difference compared with other groups is small.
Under automatic enrollment, many of these extreme allocations are reduced by half or more (Figure 9 , bottom). Most participants remain invested in a narrow range from 50% to 90% equities, with the overwhelming majority having an 81% to 90% equity exposure. (Because our study considers only newhire automatic enrollment, and most new hires are younger, they are automatically defaulted to a targetdate portfolio in this range.) But not all extreme portfolios are eliminated. Even under automatic enrollment, there are still participants willing to override the default and choose a more aggressive or conservative equity allocation. But these behaviors occur at a much lower rate than they do in voluntary plans.
Note: Automatic enrollment includes plans with and without an automatic escalation feature.
Source: Vanguard, 2011.
Distribution of equity allocations by type of enrollment and race/ethnicity Figure 9 . 11 See Young, 2011 for a general analysis of target-date funds and extreme asset allocations.
Active participants in seven de ned contribution plans as of 2010
Does the default effect have any impact on differences among groups? We separately modeled the probability of being an aggressive (over 90% in equities) or zeroequity investor. Under voluntary enrollment, blacks are more likely to be zero-equity investors, and this tendency persists under automatic enrollment, though at a lower rate (Figure 10, top) . Asians and whites are more likely to be aggressive equity investors, under both voluntary enrollment and automatic enrollmentalthough, again, automatic enrollment reduces the level significantly (Figure 10 , bottom).
In total, default investing into a target-date fund with automatic enrollment appears to virtually eliminate differences in equity risk-taking and reduce extreme allocations for all groups. However, it does not appear to eliminate a very small but persistent risk difference among blacks, Asians, and whites when it comes to investing at the extremes. 
Voluntary enrollment Automatic enrollment
Extreme equity allocations by type of enrollment and race/ethnicity Figure 10 .
Active participants in seven de ned contribution plans as of 2010
Predicted probability of being a zero-equity investor 
Implications
Based on a study of seven large DC plans, covering a quarter-million plan participants, we find that automatic plan features help mitigate racial and ethnic differences in saving and investing behavior.
The most significant effect is on plan participation rates. Automatic enrollment dramatically improves plan participation among blacks and Hispanics, particularly among low-income participants in these groups. Yet it also has a positive effect for whites and Asians, who also participate at higher rates than they do in voluntary plans.
Automatic enrollment into a target-date fund series also eliminates differences in equity risk-taking among groups, and has the beneficial effect of reducing extreme equity allocations, particularly overly aggressive allocations. Blacks and Hispanics are also more likely to remain in the plan default than whites and Asians.
However, automatic enrollment does not necessarily eliminate group differences in terms of employee deferral rates. While some members of all groups tend to override the default deferral rate, Asians and whites are more likely to do so than blacks and Hispanics-leading to differences in plan contribution levels. An automatic increase feature does raise deferral rates across the board, and perhaps with time it may also mitigate differences among racial and ethnic groups. However, in our sample of plans, the automatic increase feature is relatively new, and the typical participant was subject to only a single automatic increase, which occurred during or shortly after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, confounding our analysis of the effects of the feature. Further research is needed on whether an automatic increase feature can eliminate differences in plan contribution behavior related to race and ethnicity.
Our results indicate that automatic design features must be carefully planned to ensure long-term retirement security for all groups. In particular, it seems important to establish higher initial default contribution rates under automatic enrollment and to augment automatic enrollment with an automatic escalation feature to ensure adequate retirement savings over time. The use of an appropriate, diversified default investment such as a target-date fund series is also recommended to reduce differences in average investing behavior and the overall incidence of extreme portfolios.
Appendix
Our statistical models are cross-sectional and of the following general form. For the ith participant in the jth plan, we examined the relationship between different outcome variables, Outcome i,j , with employee race and ethnicity, Race/Ethnicity i,j , while controlling for other demographic characteristics:
A logistic model was used to study the following binary (1/0) outcome variables: the propensity to be a plan participant, the propensity to be an aggressive equity investor, the propensity to be a zero-equity investor, and the propensity to remain invested solely in the default option. Ordinary least squares (OLS) models were used for employee contribution rates and equity allocations.
All models included four race/ethnicity categories coded as dummy variables: white, black, Hispanic, and Asian. The demographic controls included age, gender, tenure, income, nonretirement household wealth, and level of educational attainment. Our models do not include current DC plan account balances as an independent variable for two reasons: 1) We expect to use DC plan balances as a dependent variable in future work; and 2) the models already include covariates strongly associated with balance (income, education, age, and tenure), and the effects reported in this paper are robust to whether or not it is included.
In addition to the main effects, interaction terms involving race/ethnicity and the type of enrollment (voluntary, automatic enrollment only, automatic enrollment with an automatic escalation feature) were included. When evaluating interactions, the reference group is all voluntarily enrolled participants. When evaluating main effects, the reference group is voluntarily enrolled white participants. All of the regression results are shown as predicted values for the dependent variable.
To address possible correlation of error terms arising from participants within a given plan, the regressions control for plan-level heteroskedasticity, v j .
Our results are robust to a wide variety of specifications. In our modeling, we evaluated incorporating other plan design features but these led to unreliable model results because of the small number of plans in our sample. In terms of data definitions, both automatic enrollment and automatic escalation rules were defined at the plan level. We classified individual participants according to these rules based on hire dates and the dates for introducing the plan features. In the case of the two plans that "swept" all existing eligible nonparticipants into the plan, we reclassified these employees as eligible nonparticipants under voluntary enrollment in order to focus exclusively on the effects of new-hire automatic enrollment.
Complete regression results, including coefficients, standard errors, and predicted marginal effects, are available from the authors. All investmenting is subject to risk, including the possible loss of money you invest. Bond funds are subject to the risk that an issuer will fail to make payments on time, and that bond prices will decline because of rising interest rates or negative perceptions of an issuer's ability to make payments. Diversification does not ensure a profit or protect against a loss.
This document contains historical data, which is to be used for informational purposes only.
